It is unclear if it's "required" to do this on RIS, but it's useful when
calling reset(1) after interactive programs have crashed and garbled up
the screen.
FWIW, other terminals do it as well (tested with XTerm, VTE, Kitty,
Alacritty, Linux VT).
Consider the following example:
printf '\e[?7l';\
for i in $(seq $(($(tput cols) - 1))); do printf a; done;\
printf '🙈\n';\
printf '\e[?7h'
Even though MODE_WRAP has been disabled, the emoji appeared on the next
line. This patch keeps wide glyphs on the same line and moves them to
the right-most possible position.
Fixes garbage selections when switching to/from the alternate screen.
How to reproduce:
- Be in primary screen.
- Select something.
- Run this (switches to alternate screen, positions the cursor at the
bottom, triggers selscroll(), and then goes back to primary screen):
tput smcup; tput cup $(tput lines) 0; echo foo; tput rmcup
- Notice how the (visual) selection now covers a different line.
The reason is that selscroll() calls selnormalize() and that cannot find
the original range anymore. It's all empty lines now, so it snaps to
"select the whole line".
Under insert mode, when inserting a normal character in front of
a wide character, the affected region is shifted to the right by
one cell. However, the empty cell is reset as if being a part of a
wide character, causing the following cell being mishandled as a
dummy cell.
To reproduce the bug:
printf '\033[4h' # set MODE_INSERT
printf 妳好
printf '\033[4D'
printf 'x'
printf '\033[4l\n'
Ignore processing and printing C1 control characters in UTF-8 mode.
These are in the range: 0x80 - 0x9f.
By default in st the mode is set to UTF-8.
This matches more the behaviour of xterm with the options -u8 or +u8 also.
Also see the xterm resource "allowC1Printable".
Let me know if this breaks something, in most cases I don't think so.
As usual a very good reference is:
https://invisible-island.net/xterm/ctlseqs/ctlseqs.html
"VT100 defines an escape sequence [1] called Device Status Report (DSR). When
the DSR sequence received is `csi 5n`, an "OK" response `csi 0n` is returned.
This patch adds that "OK" response.
I encountered this missing sequence when I noticed that fzf [2] would clobber
my prompt whenever completing a find.
To test that ST doesn't currently respond to `csi 5n`, use fzf's shell
extension in ST's repo to complete the path for a file.
my-fancy-prompt $ vim **<tab>
<select a file>
st.c
Select a file with <enter>, and notice that fzf clobbers some or all of your
prompt.
After applying this patch, do the same test as above and notice that fzf has no
longer clobbered your prompt by placing the file name in the correct position
in your command.
my-fancy-prompt $ vim **<tab>
<select a file>
my-fancy prompt $ vim st.c
Thank you for considering my first patch submission.
[1] https://www.xfree86.org/current/ctlseqs.html#VT100%20Mode
[2] https://github.com/junegunn/fzf
"
Patch slightly adapted with input from the mailinglist,
Adapted from (garbled) patch by wim <wim@thinkerwim.org>
Additional notes: it should reset all the colors using xloadcols().
To reproduce: set a different (theme) color using some escape code, then reset
it:
printf '\x1b]104\x07'
* adds missing function prototype
* move xgetcolor() prototype to win.h (that's where all the other x.c
func prototype seems to be declared at)
* check for snprintf error/truncation
* reduces code duplication for osc 10/11/12
* unify osc_color_response() and osc4_color_response() into a single function
the latter two was suggested by Quentin Rameau in his patch review on
the hackers list.
the array is not accessed outside of base64dec() so it makes sense to
limit it's scope to the related function. the static-storage duration of
the array is kept intact.
this also removes unnecessary explicit zeroing from the start and end of
the array. anything that wasn't explicitly zero-ed will now be
implicitly zero-ed instead.
the validity of the new array can be easily confirmed via running this
trivial loop:
for (int i = 0; i < 255; ++i)
assert(base64_digits[i] == base64_digits_old[i]);
lastly, as pointed out by Roberto, the array needs to have 256 elements
in order to able access it as any unsigned char as an index; the
previous array had 255.
however, this array will only be accessed at indexes which are
isprint() || '=' (see `base64dec_getc()`), so reducing the size of the
array to the highest printable ascii char (127 AFAIK) + 1 might also be
a valid strategy.
Overtyping the first half of a wide character with the
second half of a wide character results in display garbage.
This is because the trailing dummy is not cleaned up.
i.e. ATTR_WIDE, ATTR_WDUMMY, ATTR_WDUMMY
Here is a short script for demonstrating the behavior:
#!/bin/sh
alias printf=/usr/bin/printf
printf こんにちは！; sleep 2
printf '\x1b[5D'; sleep 2
printf へ; sleep 2
printf ' '; sleep 2
echo
In the current implementation, the slave PTY (assigned to the variable
`s') is always closed after duplicating it to file descriptors of
standard streams (0, 1, and 2). However, when the allocated slave PTY
`s' is already one of 0, 1, or 2, this causes unexpected closing of a
standard stream. The same problem occurs when the file descriptor of
the master PTY (the variable `m') is one of 0, 1, or 2.
In this patch, the original master PTY (m) is closed before it would
be overwritten by duplicated slave PTYs. The original slave PTY (s)
is closed only when it is not one of the stanrad streams.
Reported on the mailinglist:
"
I discovered recently that if an application running inside st tries to
send a DCS string, subsequent Unicode characters get messed up. For
example, consider the following test-case:
printf '\303\277\033P\033\\\303\277'
...where:
- \303\277 is the UTF-8 encoding of U+00FF LATIN SMALL LETTER Y WITH
DIAERESIS (ÿ).
- \033P is ESC P, the token that begins a DCS string.
- \033\\ is ESC \, a token that ends a DCS string.
- \303\277 is the same ÿ character again.
If I run the above command in a VTE-based terminal, or xterm, or
QTerminal, or pterm (PuTTY), I get the output:
ÿÿ
...which is to say, the empty DCS string is ignored. However, if I run
that command inside st (as of commit 9ba7ecf), I get:
ÿÿ
...where those last two characters are \303\277 interpreted as ISO8859-1
characters, instead of UTF-8.
I spent some time tracing through the state machines in st.c, and so far
as I can tell, this is how it works currently:
- ESC P sets the "ESC_DCS" and "ESC_STR" flags, indicating that
incoming bytes should be collected into the strescseq buffer, rather
than being interpreted.
- ESC \ sets the "ESC_STR_END" flag (when ESC is received), and then
calls strhandle() (when \ is received) to interpret the collected
bytes.
- If the collected bytes begin with 'P' (i.e. if this was a DCS
string) strhandle() sets the "ESC_DCS" flag again, confusing the
state machine.
If my understanding is correct, fixing the problem should be as easy as
removing the line that sets ESC_DCS from strhandle():
diff --git a/st.c b/st.c
index ef8abd5..b5b805a 100644
--- a/st.c
+++ b/st.c
@@ -1897,7 +1897,6 @@ strhandle(void)
xsettitle(strescseq.args[0]);
return;
case 'P': /* DCS -- Device Control String */
- term.mode |= ESC_DCS;
case '_': /* APC -- Application Program Command */
case '^': /* PM -- Privacy Message */
return;
I've tried the above patch and it fixes my problem, but I don't know if
it introduces any others.
"
Similar to the xterm AllowWindowOps option, this is an option to allow or
disallow certain (non-interactive) operations that can be insecure or
exploited.
NOTE: xsettitle() is not guarded by this because st does not support printing
the window title. Else this could be exploitable (arbitrary code execution).
Similar problems have been found in the past in other terminal emulators.
The sequence for base64-encoded clipboard copy is now guarded because it allows
a sequence written to the terminal to manipulate the clipboard of the running
user non-interactively, for example:
printf '\x1b]52;0;ZWNobyBoaQ0=\a'
Add the functionality back in for xterm compatibility, but do not expose the
capability in st.info (yet).
Some notes:
It was reverted because it caused some issues with ncurses in some
configurations, namely when using BSD padding (--enable-bsdpad, BSD_TPUTS) in
ncurses it caused issues with repeating digits.
A fix has been upstreamed in ncurses since snapshot 20200523. The fix is also
backported to OpenBSD -current.
This reverts commit e8392b282c.
There is currently a bug in older ncurses versions (like on OpenBSD) where a
fix for a bug with REP is not backported yet. Most likely in tty/tty_update.c:
Noticed while using lynx (which uses ncurses/curses).
To reproduce using lynx: echo "Z0000000" | lynx -stdin
or using the program:
int
main(void)
{
WINDOW *win;
win = initscr();
printw("Z0000000");
refresh();
sleep(5);
return 0;
}
This prints "ZZZZZZZ" (incorrectly).
The sequence \e[Nb prints the last printed char N (more) times if it's
printable, and it's ignored after newline or other control chars.
This is Ecma-048/ANSI-X3.6 sequence and not DEC VT. It's supported by
xterm, and ncurses uses it when possible, e.g. when TERM is xterm* (and
with this commit also st*).
xterm supports only codepoints<=255, possibly due to internal limits.
We support any value/codepoint which was placed in a cell.
To test:
- tput rep 65 4 -> prints 'AAAA'
- printf "\342\225\246\033[4b" -> prints U+2566 1+4 times.
Fix an issue with incorrect (partial) written sequences when libc wcwidth() ==
-1. The sequence is updated to on wcwidth(u) == -1:
c = "\357\277\275"
but len isn't.
A way to reproduce in practise:
* st -o dump.txt
* In the terminal: printf '\xcd\xb8'
- This is codepoint 888, on OpenBSD it reports wcwidth() == -1.
- Quit the terminal.
- Look in dump.txt (partial written sequence of "UTF_INVALID").
This was introduced in:
" commit 11625c7166
Author: czarkoff@gmail.com <czarkoff@gmail.com>
Date: Tue Oct 28 12:55:28 2014 +0100
Replace character with U+FFFD if wcwidth() is -1
Helpful when new Unicode codepoints are not recognized by libc."
Change:
Remove setting the sequence. If this happens to break something, another
solution could be setting len = 3 for the sequence.
When a read operation returns 0 then it means that we arrived to the end of the
file, and new reads will return 0 unless you do some other operation such as
lseek(). This case happens with USB-232 adapters when they are unplugged.
Scroll is a program that stores all the lines of its child and be used in st as
a way of implementing scrollback.
This solution is much better than implementing the scrollback in st itself
because having a different program allows to use it in any other program
without doing modifications to those programs.
Strings which an application sends to the terminal in OSC, DCS, etc
are typically small (title, colors, etc) but one exception is OSC 52
which copies text to the clipboard, and is used for instance by tmux.
Previously st cropped these strings at 512 bytes, which for OSC 52
limited the copied text to 382 bytes (remaining buffer space before
base64). This made it less useful than it can be.
Now it's a dynamic growing buffer. It remains allocated after use,
resets to 512 when a new string starts, or leaked on exit.
Resetting/deallocating the buffer right after use (at strhandle) is
possible with some more code, however, it doesn't always end up used,
and to cover those cases too will require even more code, so resetting
only on new string is good enough for now.
STRescape holds strings in escape sequences such as OSC and DCS, and
its buffer is 512 bytes.
If the input is too big then trailing chars are ignored, but the test
was off-by-1 such that it took 510 chars instead of 511 (before a
terminating NULL is added).
Now the full size can be utilized.
Previously, base64dec checked terminating input '\0' every 4 calls to
base64dec_getc, where the latter progressed one or more chars on each
call, and could read past '\0' in the way it was used.
The input to base64dec currently comes only from OSC 52 escape seq
(copy to clipboard), and reading past '\0' or even past the buffer
boundary was easy to trigger.
Also, even if we could trust external input to be valid base64, there
are different base64 standards, and not all of them require padding
to 4 bytes blocks (using trailing '=' chars).
It didn't affect short OSC 52 strings because the buffer is initialized
to 0's, so typically it did stop within the buffer, but if the string
was trimmed to fit (the buffer is 512 bytes) then it did also read past
the end of the buffer, and the decoded suffix ended up arbitrary.
This patch makes base64dec_getc not progress past '\0', and instead
produce fake trailing padding of '='.
Additionally, at base64dec, if padding is detected at the first or
second byte of a quartet, then we identify it as invalid and abort
(a valid quartet has at least two leading non-padding bytes).
"use iswspace()/iswpunct() to find word delimiters
this inverts the configuration logic: you no longer provide a list of
delimiters -- all space and punctuation characters are considered
delimiters, unless listed in extrawordchars."
Feedback from IRC and personal preference.
Alex Selimov
Peter Hofmann
Shi Tian
Hiltjo Posthuma
Adam Price
Tom Schwindl
NRK
Santtu Lakkala
jamin
Jochen Sprickerhof
Raheman Vaiya
Koichi Murase
Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer
John Collis
Avi Halachmi (:avih)
Jakub Leszczak
Jan Klemkow
Ivan Tham
Quentin Rameau
Roberto E. Vargas Caballero